Service Network Graph (SNG) was proposed as a network service sharing infrastructure to support secure services on dynamic aggregation of heterogeneous networks. To participate in SNG, a network has to share a secret key with one member of the SNG. The shared secret key will be used to set up an encrypted channel between the network and the SNG member. It is imperative to authenticate the data sent through the encrypted channel. This paper uses the symbols and approached presented by Lampson in his paper [15] to provide a formal proof of how encryption channel authenticates itself in SNG. It forms the basis of using encrypted channels in SNG.
Introduction
In many occasions, Internet users are not entirely happy using only the services available on their home networks. They always look forward to use services provided by other foreign networks. It is a common experience that we can extend our capability or creativity if we can take advantage of all the services that we are aware of. The reason why we cannot use all the services offered in different administrative domains is either it is too expansive, or simply impossible, to join all related networks individually by ourselves. It would be much simpler if one network can join another network and share their services to their home users. If multiple networks are linked together for service sharing, the immediate problem is how to authenticate users of the participating networks. Due to the issues of information privacy, underlying platforms, and network resources, it is practically and technically not feasible to share all the users authentication information with all linked networks.
Despite various efforts such as the use of X.509 certificates [1] , trust recommendations [4, 7, 16, 18] , trust establishment [6, 17, 2, 3, 5] and Kerberos [8] none has resulted in a viable solution to the problem. Our approach is to use Service Network Graph (SNG) [14, 11, 10, 13, 12] . SNG was first proposed in 2005. SNG enables the linking of heterogenous networks in an ad hoc manner to form a Service Network Graph. Within the service network graph, home users of individual networks can share the services provided by other networks within SNG. Furthermore, Dynamic Password [9] can used to complement SNG and forms an authentication protocol suite for heterogenous aggregation of ad hoc networks.
As shown in Figure 1 , in order to participate in an SNG, the authentication server AS 1 of a network is required to share a secret key with the authentication server AS 2 of another network within SNG to which the network intends to attach to. The newly joined network will use this key to set up encryption channels between AS 1 and AS 2 . Privacy of communications between authentication servers are protected by encryption using the shared key. 
joins Network 2 in an SNG
Similar to most secure transaction protocols such as SSH and Kerberos, it is important to authenticate the incoming data as well. Authenticating data helps to prevent impersonation and spoofing. SNG made use of the selfauthenticating property of encrypted channels to achieve its protocol correctness. The self-authentication property can be one-way or two-way. SNG can be perceived as a net-Original Symbol Our Symbol Meaning ⇒ Speaks for ⊃ ⇒ implies Table 1 . Symbols we use in this paper which differs from the ones used in [15] work of networks in which the participating networks are linked together by self-authenticated encrypted channels as shown in Figure 2 . In this paper we use the symbols and approach similar to that presented by Lampson [15] to give a formal proof of self-authentication for encrypted channels in SNG.
This paper is organized into four sections. In Section 2, we introduced some axioms and theorems established by Lampson in [15] first. In Section 3 we presented our proposition. We then proved the proposition by proposing and proving three lemmas. In the Conclusion section, we summarized our work in this paper and our work in the future.
Basic Theorems and Axioms
In this section, we listed a few basic theorems and axioms from Lampson [15] and Thayer [19] . All the terms and notations we use in this paper will be the same, unless we explicitly stated otherwise, as the ones used in Lampson's paper [15] . For instance, as listed in Table 1 , we replaced ⇒ with to represent the "speak for" relationship; and ⊃ with ⇒ to represent the logical "imply" relationship.
Axiom 1 (Free encryption)
Let A be a set of plain text messages with elements m, m ; and K be a set of unique encryption keys with elements K, K . For m, m ∈ A and K, K ∈ K,
Free encryption means that cypher text can only be formed in one and only one way.
Next, we illustrate a basic property of the "speak for" relationship. Note that P A , P B and s are used to denote principal A, principal B and message s, respectively,
where " s " is used to mean that "s is an axiom of the theory or is provable from the axioms". "P A P B " denotes "P A speaks for P B ".
The theorem simply says if principal A speaks for principal B, then whenever A says something, B would have said the same thing.
This Axiom says that P A can establish a "speak for" relationship with P B when he declares P B speaks for him.
The first condition of the theorem requires (P C P A ). Using Theorem 1, whatever P C says, P A would have said the same. Hence the second condition of Theorem 2 can be rewritten as (P A says (P B P A )). Using Axiom 2, if P A declares P B speaks for him, we can arrive at the conclusion (P B P A ). Theorem 1, Axiom 2, and Theorem 2 can be found in Lampson's paper [15] 3 Self-Authentication of Encrypted Channels
In this section, we will prove that an encrypted channel in SNG authenticates itself.
When a network joins an SNG as shown in Figure 1 , its authentication server (AS 1 ) shares a unique and secret key with the authentication server (AS 2 ) of a member network of the SNG. The key will be stored in the key database of AS 2 and has a key index. The shared key will be used by AS 1 to establish an encrypted channel with AS 2 . In so doing, AS 1 joins AS 2 and become part of the SNG.
The SNG joining process forms the basis of the assumptions of Proposition 1. The conclusion of Proposition 1 is that whatever encrypted message delivered by the encrypted channel will be originated from AS 1 . In other words, encrypted channels formed when joining an SNG are selfauthenticating.
The proof starts with three definitions and then three lemmas. We then apply the lemmas to prove our Proposition 1.
Definition 1 K
r is defined as a key identifier if it allows a receiver r to know what the decryption key of an encrypted channel is but doesn't disclose anything about it to others.
In the above definition, the key identifier can be
• an index to a database of keys kept by the receiver; or
• {K −1 } Km where K m is a secret master key kept by the receiver; or
where K x is a key identifier of key K .
Definition 2
When principal P A shares a unique secret key K A with principal P B , key K A and a key index K B A will be added to the database DB B of keys in P B , then we define
It follows from the assumption that the key is unique and secret. The database in P B is happy to say the speak for relationship assuming a one-to-one (K B A to P A ) mapping. Note that the mapping from P A to K B A can be one-to-many. This definition describes what happens when a unique key of one principal is shared with another principal.
Definition 3 (Encrypted channel establishment) When P A establishes an encrypted channel with P B using a unique shared key K A , then we define P A says (DB B P A ).
Note that a unique secret key has to be shared before an encrypted channel can be established.
The above definitions do not exclude the cases when a pair such as (K 
One-way Self-authentication of encrypted Channels
In this subsection, we will now show how an encrypted channel can have the property of one-way selfauthentication.
Proposition 1 (One-way Self-authentication of encrypted channels) Suppose:
1. Principal P A shares a unique secret key, K A , with principal P B ;
2. P A uses K A to establish an encryption channel with P B ;
We will prove this by working through a sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 1 Suppose there is only one unique decryption key corresponding to each encryption key used in an encrypted channel. Holder of a decryption key K −1 of an encrypted channel can infer that "K −1 says s" on receiving {s} K .
PROOF: It follows from the assumption in Lemma 1 and Axiom 1 that there is only one unique key which can get back s. We can safely associate the message s with the decryption key (index).
Lemma 2 Suppose K r is a key identifier. When a pair (K r , {s} K ) was received, the receiver can infer that "K r says s".
It is a direct application of Definition 1 to Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 Suppose:
1. Principal P A shares a unique key K A with principal P B ;
PROOF: According to assumption 1, and Definition 2, DB B says (K B A P A ). Assumption 2 and Definition 3 tells us that P A says DB B P A which is the same as DB B P A by Axiom 2.
Since both conditions listed above are assumed to be true, we can link them into a compound predicate
A)). This is the predicate in the Handoff Rule from Lampson (Theorem 2):
A)
We may now conclude that (K 3.2 Two-Way Self-authentication of encrypted Channels
Proposition 1 shows that traffic delivered to AS 2 via the encrypted channel established with the key shared by AS 1 originates from AS 1 . This is a one-way self-authentication. It would be desirable if we can extend Proposition 1 to cover a two-way self-authentication. A two-way selfauthentication means that message to AS 2 passing through the encrypted channel established with a key between AS 1 and AS 2 can be assured to be coming from AS 1 and those heading to AS 1 via the channel is assured to be coming from AS 2 . To extend Proposition 1, we need to add two assumptions and modify another assumption.
Proposition 2 (Two-Way Self-authentication of encrypted channels) Suppose:
2. Principal P B shares the same unique secret key, K A , with principal P A ;
3. P A and P B uses K A to establish an encryption channel between them;
then when P B receives (K B A , {s} K ), P B can infer that P A says s; and when P A receives (K A B , {s} K ), P A can infer that P B says s; . PROOF: Using assumptions 1, 3, 4, and Proposition 1, we can say that when P B receives (K B A , {s} K ), P B can infer that P A says s. With assumption 2, 3, 5 and Proposition 1 we can say that when P A receives (K A B , {s} K ), P A can infer that P B says s.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proved that encrypted channels in SNG authenticate themselves. We have shown that the encrypted channels can achieve both one-way and two-way self-authentication.
In Section 3.1, Proposition 1 simply says that when we receive a message from an encrypted channel, we can infer that the principal who shared with us the channel encryption key is the one who send the message. Thus we can safely conclude that messages delivered by encrypted channels are authenticated. There is no extra steps needed to authenticate the messages received. The channel encryption key provides us with sender information. We can conclude that an encrypted channel authenticates itself.
In Section 3.2, we extended Proposition 1 to include twoway self-authentication as stated in Proposition 2. Proposition 2 was proved using a similar approach as used in proving Proposition 1. Hence we can conclude that encrypted channels in SNG are self-authenticated, either one-way or two-way depending on the setup configuration when a network joins the SNG.
Our next step is to prove the correctness of the Service Network Graph which can provide user authentication across heterogeneous networks of different administrative domain without sharing user authentication information.
